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A successful social interaction often requires on-line and active construction of an ever-
changing mental-model of another person’s beliefs, expectations, emotions, and desires.
It also requires the ability to maintain focus, problem-solve, and ﬂexibly pursue goals in
a distraction-rich environment, as well as the ability to take-turns and inhibit inappropri-
ate behaviors. Many of these tasks rely on executive functions (EF) – working memory,
attention/cognitive control, and inhibition. Executive functioning has long been viewed as
relatively static. However, starting with recent reports of successful cognitive interven-
tions, this view is changing and now EFs are seen as much more open to both short- and
long-term “training,” “warm-up,” and “exhaustion” effects. Some of the most intriguing
evidence suggests that engaging in social interaction enhances performance on standard
EF tests. Interestingly, the latest research indicates these EF beneﬁts are selectively con-
ferred by certain on-line, dynamic social interactions, which require participants to mentally
engage with another person and actively construct a model of their mind. We review this
literature and highlight its connection with evolutionary and cultural theories emphasizing
links between intelligence and sociality.
Keywords: socializing, executive function, on-line social cognition, mental fitness
Consider a simple act of tossing a ball toward a basketball hoop. To
be successful, this act requires the ability to integrate and represent
many bits of information, including the body’s position, informa-
tion about how the ball feels in ones hands, knowledge about the
ball’s kinematics, and visual cues indicating distance to the hoop,
for example. Now consider trying to succeed at this task when
other players are involved, running around on the court. Some of
the same mental calculations have to be executed regarding ball
tossing, but now the task is much more complex, as the other
players in dynamic social context have to be taken into consider-
ation. This necessitates that the perceiver track who is friend or
foe, where the other players are, what goals their behavior suggests,
and how to coordinate with them. The complex nature of calculat-
ing ball trajectories and physical causality is now ampliﬁed by the
complexity of determining human intentions to help teammates
and to try to outsmart competitors (Camerer, 2003). Further, to
be effective, all of this has to be done in real time where speed and
responsiveness matter, but in conjunction with the ability to keep
plays and plans in mind and the ability to update the progress of
the game.
In on-line social interaction – as it unfolds in real life and not
just the basketball court – the involved parties run the risk of
catching each other’s gaze, smelling each other’s breath, and even
patting each other on the back after a good shot or as a sign of sup-
port. Being plugged into Facebook probably does not qualify as a
mentally rich, on-line social interaction (even though it does occur
“on-line”), nor does trying to conjure up an image of a person or a
person’smindwhile in a brain scanner. Clearly, important progress
has been made regarding the neural correlates of off-line social
cognition, and there are some attempts to introduce elements
of real social interaction in neuroimaging paradigms (Tomlin
et al., 2006). However, a genuine, on-line social interaction is a
dynamic and somewhat unstructured event, and many times the
involved parties are moving targets with goals of their own, which
implicates different cognitive processes for social understanding
to occur.
Of course not all social interactions are the same, as they candif-
fer in myriad ways. They can involve routinized daily encounters
with acquaintances and simple greetings on the street. But they
also can involve a diverse range of more intense social interac-
tions, spanning the gamut from forming impressions on dates and
performance in job interviews, to discussions of policies with col-
leagues, consultations of clothing choices with a sensitive spouse,
bargaining with a sneaky salesperson, to performing a complex
dance, playing a bridge game, or having a diplomatic negotia-
tion. Often, to be effective in the latter, complex and often more
consequential type of social interaction a perceiver is required
to develop an on-line representation of a dynamic and changing
mental-model of another person’s beliefs, expectations, emotions,
and desires. The perceiver also must be able to problem-solve,
inhibit inappropriate behaviors, take-turns, and pursue goals in a
distraction-rich environment.
Clearly, some mental processes in social interaction are auto-
matic and largely environment-driven, and they may not even rise
to the level of “implicit mentalizing” (Leudar and Costall, 2008).
Other mental processes might be inferential but still be sponta-
neous and efﬁcient (e.g.,Winter and Uleman, 1984; Trope, 1986).
Thus, people can achieve some level of mentalizing and social
understanding through processes that do not draw on executive
functions (EFs; e.g., Flavell et al., 1981; Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005; Moll and Tomasello, 2006; Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson
et al., 2010). However, it is also clear that many times during real
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social interaction some social cognition relies on EF. For example,
the link between social reasoning and EF has long been empha-
sized in the theory-of-mind literature (Hughes and Ensor, 2007;
Apperly et al., 2009).With ineffective executive functioning people
should be less able to track and update the meaning being created
in a conversation, be less able to consider another person’s per-
spective, or be less able to negotiate, which bodes poorly for social
coordination and acceptance by others. Accordingly, investigating
the effects that social factors have on EFs appears scientiﬁcally
fruitful and important to understanding the nature of on-line
social cognition. In this short review, we discuss how EFs are
shaped by social interaction and highlight discoveries suggesting
that on-line and off-line social cognition differ in the nature of
EF involvement.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND THEIR
MALLEABILITY
Different ways exist to conceptualize executive functioning. For
research that has applied latent statistical models, the focus is on
classiﬁcation and documenting both the diversity and unity of
EFs. Although related, EFs can be classiﬁed into three categories,
including (i) working memory and updating, (ii) executive atten-
tion or cognitive control, and (iii) inhibition (e.g., Miyake et al.,
2000; Friedman et al., 2006; Miyake and Friedman, 2012). But
the three aspects also form an integrated mechanism for process-
ing information. This broader mechanism underlies the ability to
manipulate and maintain tasks, plans, and goals (i.e., their mental
representations) in an active state while monitoring performance
and inhibiting distracting stimuli, whether from the environment
or internally (Kane and Engle, 2002).
Executive functioning is a central topic in many areas of
psychology (Posner and Rothbart, 2007). Various theoretical
frameworks emphasize that while some cognitive processes can
run efﬁciently on limited cognitive resources, many others engage
executive functioning. Within social psychology, EFs are impor-
tant for a wide array of sub-ﬁelds that inform the nature of social
behavior, including persuasion, attitudes and prejudice, social per-
ception, self-control, and emotion regulation, for example (e.g.,
Smith and DeCoster, 2000; von Hippel, 2007). In all these areas of
social functioning, automatic processes are thought to help create
a “ﬁrst-pass,” working model of the event (e.g., perceiver readily
infers a speaker seems competent due to style of dress). Assuming
the perceiver is motivated and has the requisite cognitive resources
(EFs), they then can integrate more information about the event
to enrich the working model and arrive at a deeper social under-
standing (for reviews, see Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Smith and
DeCoster, 2000).
One central question about EFs in day-to-day life is their mal-
leability. Except for changes across the lifespan (e.g., von Hippel,
2007), people’s executive functioning has long been viewed as rel-
atively static – perhaps because of robust individual differences
in EFs. However, starting with recent reports of successful cog-
nitive interventions, this view has begun to change and now EFs
are seen as much more open to both short- and long-term “train-
ing,” “warm-up,” and “exhaustion” effects. Research has shown,
for example, that working memory training not only leads to
improvements on distinct measures of executive functioning but
also to transfer effects resulting in improvement on measures
of ﬂuid intelligence (e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2008, 2011). In young
children, cognitive training has been shown to improve subse-
quent attention control (e.g., Thorell et al., 2008). Other ﬁndings
indicate EFs beneﬁt from meditation training (e.g., Tang and
Posner, 2009).
However, some of the most intriguing evidence comes from
research showing that social engagement enhances performance
on standard EF tests. This is important since the majority of peo-
ple’s life takes place in the social world – interacting on-line with
other humans.
SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING
ON-LINE SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONING BOOSTS
It has long been argued that communicating with others, tak-
ing others’ perspectives, and following social rules sets the stage
for the development and maintenance of EFs, thus helping struc-
ture general mental functioning (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978; Buttelmann
et al., 2009). As previously mentioned, the developmental liter-
ature has long linked EFs to performance on some aspects of
ToM (Hughes and Ensor, 2007). Selection pressures related to
the complex, dynamic and mixed-motive nature of social life
have also been posited to partly underlie the evolution of pri-
mate intelligence (e.g., Jolly, 1966; Humphrey, 1976; Dunbar
and Shultz, 2007). There also are intriguing suggestions regard-
ing the overlap of the neural underpinnings of EF and social
reasoning processes (von Hippel, 2007; Adolphs, 2009). And
there are now several reports of positive correlations of some
brain structures with social network size. For example, amyg-
dala size correlates with the size and complexity of real social
networks (Bickart et al., 2011), whereas gray matter correlates
with the number of Facebook friends (Kanai et al., 2011). More
impressively, it appears that, at least in macaques, social net-
work size causally inﬂuences brain structure and function (Sallet
et al., 2011).
With humans, much cross-sectional and longitudinal research
has found positive relationships between social participa-
tion/engagement and executive functioning and related mental
health outcomes (e.g., Fratiglioni et al., 2004). Some ﬁndings with
distinct populations also indirectly support the notion that EFs
beneﬁt from social processes. Thus, for example, a Vygotskian
based curriculum (Tools of the mind) – which requires much
social interaction and taking others’ perspective – boosted not
only preschoolers’ social skills but also their executive function-
ing (e.g., Diamond et al., 2007). Although most of the available
work examining the effects of social engagement relies on cor-
relational designs, a few studies are beginning to show positive
causal effects of social processes on executive functioning, and
the most direct evidence comes from social psychological research
investigating the effect of on-line social interaction on executive
functioning.
In one experiment, we had participants interact by having
a discussion of a social topic (Ybarra et al., 2008). Participants
were given 10 min total, with a few minutes to prepare for the
discussion. Following the interaction the participants evaluated
the activity and then completed tests of cognitive functioning, in
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particular a test of workingmemory which is a critical component
of executive functioning. We also tested participants assigned to
either an intellectual activities condition or a control condition
that involved watching a 10-min video. The ﬁndings indicated the
social interaction group outperformed the controls. Further, social
interaction beneﬁted EF performance similarly to the intellectual
activities.
Another aspect of this“mental exercising through simple social-
izing” research that should be highlighted is that participants
assigned to the video condition were presented with social content
involving several human characters that were engaged in social
interaction (Ybarra et al., 2008). In a sense, the video content rep-
resents a rich stimulus compared to many of the stimuli used to
study social cognitive processes from a neuroscientiﬁc perspec-
tive. Still, the video condition did not result in any boosts to EFs;
it was the real, on-line social interaction that resulted in EF boosts,
which were equivalent to those resulting from engaging in dif-
ﬁcult intellectual activities. Thus, beneﬁts to EFs are selectively
seen in on-line social cognition, where participants dynamically
construct a model of another person, and less in off-line social
cognition where participants deal with static or impoverished and
less engaging representations of others.
Regarding the above research, the argument could be made
that the discussion that comprised the social interaction was atyp-
ical in some way, in that participants had to take positions, make
arguments, and discuss their point of view. But as recent theoriz-
ing on the evolution of reasoning suggests, this aspect of social
interaction – evaluating arguments and proffering others – may
have been an important pressure on the evolution of our distinc-
tive human cognition (Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Further, as
we will discuss later, recent research indicates EF boosts also can
result from basic get-to-know-you interactions if structured in a
particular, mind-engaging way (Ybarra et al., 2011). So the pos-
itive effects on EFs can occur from other types of on-line social
interactions.
ON-LINE SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING
REDUCTIONS
Our own research suggests that social interaction can boost
EFs. However, evidence also exists for the detrimental effects of
some social interactions on EFs. Most of these ﬁndings come
from research on intergroup social interactions (e.g., Richeson
and Trawalter, 2005). In one study, for example, participants
who underwent an interracial interview compared to a same
race interview subsequently exhibited more interference on a
Stroop task, a measure of EF. Further, this effect was greater
the stronger participants’ associations between concepts denot-
ing African-Americans and negative personality characteristics,
as measured with the IAT test. These negative effects on EFs
were undone by lessening participants’ concerns about appearing
prejudiced.
Another form of intergroup context involves interactions
between men and women. Studies found that after interacting
with an attractive female, men showed worse performance on a
subsequent EF task, and the decline was related to the degree men
tried to manage their impression in the interaction (Karremans
et al., 2009).
Research also has shown that challenging or “high mainte-
nance” interactions can result in reduction of cognitive func-
tioning (Finkel et al., 2006). These investigators had participants
coordinate on a task with a confederate, who in some cases made
scripted errors (high maintenance) and in some cases did not
(low maintenance). Participants in the high maintenance condi-
tion performed worse on various subsequent tests, although in
this research the tests were indirectly tied to EFs.
SOLVING THE SOCIAL INTERACTION-EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION PUZZLE
The ﬁndings that social interactions inﬂuence executive function-
ing are fascinating. They might also be surprising given that many
times social processes are considered“soft”and distinct from intel-
lectual and reasoning processes. However, the ﬁndings are also
puzzling. Why do some interactions lead to EF impairments but
other interactions to beneﬁts?
One solution emerges when we consider the social cognitive
mechanisms underlying social interaction. Note that most, if not
all, studies showing EF reductions invoked self-presentation con-
cerns (e.g., about appearing non-prejudiced, unintelligent, etc.).
This concern has several consequences that persist beyond the ini-
tial interaction. First, it constitutes a workingmemory load (“what
was the interaction about?” “how did I do?,” etc.). Second, it trig-
gers effortful attempts to self-regulate, which, if extensive, could
deplete cognitive resources (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). At
a broader level this reasoning also applies to some of the ﬁnd-
ings dealing with performance decrements under conditions of
stereotype threat, for example.
In our opinion, however, one key difference between studies
showing reductions and boosts in EFs has to do with the nature
of the interaction. In particular, it is critical whether partici-
pants mentally engage with others and attempt to build a rich
model of their minds, that they toggle between self and other
perspectives, and that they communicate and create meaning
during the social interaction versus disengage from the interac-
tion. We argue that this is often, though not always (see below),
determined by whether the interaction is cooperative or com-
petitive. Clearly, both interaction types can invoke mentalizing.
However, the default in a cooperative setting is often to engage
with the other person, build a model of their mind, ﬁgure out
whether or not they are trustworthy, and convey to them that
they can trust us. In fact, under these trust-building conditions
neuroimaging work has reported some of the most robust effects
of mentalizing on activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (for
reviews, see Frith and Singer, 2008). Further, children’s ability to
mentalize (i.e., perform ToM tasks) has been shown to be pos-
itively correlated to the likelihood of cooperating, for example,
in prisoner’s dilemma games and also to making fair offers in
the ultimatum game (Sally and Hill, 2006; also see Buttelmann
et al., 2009).
In contrast, the default under competitive goals, as realized in
the above research on intergroup interactions, is often to become
self-protective andwithdraw from engaging the other person. This
mayoccur because the interaction is ambiguous andnotwell struc-
tured, which inclines people to back away from the situation as a
general way of deterring interpersonal costs (Ybarra et al., 2010).
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This may also occur because people have a tendency to“dehuman-
ize” outgroups and thus attribute less mind to their competitors
(Harris and Fiske, 2006). Finally, it is possible that competition
(but also other high-stake situations) may sometimes usurp the
cognitive resources necessary for careful and effortful mentaliz-
ing. So, people focus on themselves and their own interests rather
than the other person, and they do not engage in attempts to
take perspective and create a rich model of the other and the
event.
A key aspect then of whether or not social interaction creates
subsequent EF boosts rests on people engaging each other. We
propose that doing so invokes processes that exercise underlying
EFs, such as workingmemory and executive attention. Thus, when
people engage with others in social interaction, versus withdraw
into themselves, they can exercise or “warm-up” these core cogni-
tive processes,whose inﬂuence is then transferred (far) to executive
functioning tasks (Ybarra et al., 2008).
If such social cognitive processes underlie the cognitive boosts,
disrupting them should eliminate the cognitive beneﬁts. Consis-
tent with this idea, our recent experiments found that interaction
goals (competition) that disengage participants from perspective
taking and mentalizing eliminate the cognitive beneﬁts that can
result from social interaction (Ybarra et al., 2011, Study 1). Impor-
tantly, follow-up work has shown that getting people to engage
others during interaction, even when the interaction is compet-
itive, helps counter the loss in cognitive beneﬁts (Ybarra et al.,
2011, Study 3). This is consistent with other research in social
cognition suggesting that skepticism, suspiciousness, and other
“competitive” approaches can sometimes improve mental perfor-
mance (Schul et al., 2004, 2008). These ﬁndings provide evidence
that engaging the other during interaction along with concomi-
tant social cognitive processing (perspective taking,mind-reading)
may partly underlie the boosts to executive functioning following
social interaction.
The above ﬁndings also help inform, at least in some small
measure, the assumption that competition in social contexts
played an important role in the evolution of primate cogni-
tion and the more intense varieties of social cognition and
mentalizing (e.g., Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Whiten and Byrne,
1997). Dealing with competitors can of course implicate the
understanding of others’ behavioral tendencies and psychologi-
cal states (e.g., Tomasello et al., 2003; Decety et al., 2004), but
as we have shown in our experiments, people who expect to
compete during social interaction, if not given an explicit goal
to read the other person and form a model of what they are
like, will disengage and behave evasively (Ybarra et al., 2010)
and not receive cognitive beneﬁts from the interaction (Ybarra
et al., 2011). These ﬁndings suggest that people when compet-
ing have diverse options they can undertake, such as to try
to hide or foil prediction. Only when no, low-risk option is
available will they engage or confront the opponent. This, how-
ever, does not mean some level of social understanding is not
sought or created under competitive circumstances, but it may
be that the working model of the other is of a generic, stereo-
typic nature that relies less on EFs, similar to the social perception
differences found when people judge members of outgroups ver-
sus ingroups (Neuberg and Fiske, 1987; Brewer, 1988). When
interdependence is called for – meaning you have to interact
on-line with a person and that your behavior is to some degree
yoked to theirs – the situation should instigate more intense
social cognition and mentalizing to build a richer model of the
other party.
The discussion of competitionhelps highlight the rolewe assign
tomentalizing and understanding others’psychological states dur-
ing social interaction. We propose that mental engagement with
others leads to cognitive beneﬁts from social interaction especially
when the involved parties are taking perspective and dynamically
building a model of what the other person is like. As we noted
in the introduction, some social inferential processes can occur
quite efﬁciently with little reliance on EFs (e.g., Winter and Ule-
man, 1984; Trope, 1986). A similar theme comes up in research
on theory of mind, with certain processes (e.g., the calculation
of what another sees) thought to be carried out efﬁciently and
automatically (e.g., Moll and Tomasello, 2006; Onishi and Bail-
largeon, 2005; Qureshi et al., 2010). Related ideas on the role of
efﬁcient social understanding also have been discussed from the
point of view of embodied and situated social cognition (Leu-
dar et al., 2004; Barrett and Henzi, 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005).
However, some ToM and mentalizing processes such as the selec-
tion of information for further processing, though, are thought to
require limited cognitive resources or EF (e.g., Leslie et al., 2005;
Bull et al., 2008; Qureshi et al., 2010), and engagement with others
in social interaction is considered the real domain in which minds
are known (Reddy and Morris, 2004).
Thus, there are important elements of building a model of
what another person is like, what they are thinking, and what
they might do next that rely on EFs. Our proposal is that during
real social interaction both low-level and high-level mentalizing
and behavior prediction processes interact and inform each other.
The automatic processes serve as input that feed into richer rep-
resentations that are shaped and updated by processes requiring
limited cognitive resources in real time. As noted with compe-
tition, it is not that people who are dealing with antagonistic
parties fail to attempt to understand their foes – some basic and
generic calculations take place. But it is during social interac-
tion when the parties are actively engaged with each other that
richer representations of the other and of the interaction are cre-
ated and dynamically updated, which entails the participation
of EFs. It is such interactions that we believe result in cognitive
beneﬁts.
In addition to the issues discussed above, furtherwork is needed
to address the following questions:
• What speciﬁc types of social interactions beneﬁt EF and what
are the underlying processes that underlie theses boosts?
• Given both the unity and diversity of EFs, does social interac-
tion affect some EF elements more than others, or does this
also depend on the type of interaction?
• How long do cognitive boosts last and what is there time
course, and does this depend on the task to which the cognitive
processes are applied?
• Are the neural correlates underlying on-line social interaction,
in particular those underlying EFs, similar or different from
the correlates unearthed for off-line social interaction?
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• How do short-term training effects of social interaction
translate into long-term cognitive reserve, which may be cap-
tured in the cross-sectional and longitudinal studies on social
engagement and cognitive functioning?
• And, what are the longer-term consequences of repeated inter-
actions that result in EF reductions? If people do not avoid
others different from the self, can they learn to cope with such
challenging interactions? If so, could this subsequentlymitigate
EF reductions and possibly even create boosts?
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
In addition to theoretical implications regarding the difference
between real, on-line social cognition versus off-line social cogni-
tion, the processes discussed here have several practical implica-
tions. The major one is that certain social interactions can be an
effective way of “keeping mentally ﬁt.” People are becoming ever
more interested in improving their mental ﬁtness. SharpBrains, a
company that tracks the mental ﬁtness industry, estimated that
worldwide revenue associated with cognitive training programs
(e.g., computer software) surged to $850 million in 2008, up from
$250 million in 2005. This is a positive development as people
actively try to improve their cognitive functioning.
Unfortunately, many of these training programs are not only
expensive, but few have been scientiﬁcally evaluated (Jaeggi et al.,
2011). More germane to this proposal, what is important to
emphasize is that what also matters is engagement and taking an
active and not a passive role to the technology or the social inter-
action. As reviewed earlier, some forms of social interaction result
in no boosts, whereas those in which the parties were engaged
and actively tried to form a working model of the other yielded
cognitive beneﬁts. However, we would add that given that social
connections are at the core of primate life (Jolly, 1966), are cen-
tral to the human survival strategy (Barash, 1986; Dunbar, 1992,
1998; Baumeister, 2005), and yield various beneﬁts to health and
well-being (e.g., House et al., 1988; Ybarra et al., 2008), engaged
socializing with others in cooperative interaction may not only
strengthen people’s brains andminds but possibly their social rela-
tions as well, allowing them to reap the various beneﬁts that ﬂow
from such bonds.
CONCLUSION
In short, our reviewhighlights the essential role of studying on-line
social interactions for understanding the operation of fundamen-
tal cognitive processes. The reviewed ﬁndings also have practical
implications for keepingmentally ﬁt. Althoughwe focused on how
executive functioning can change due to task context, especially the
on-line social context, it is also important to appreciate the role of
people’s beliefs and strategies in social navigation.
Most of us probably know people who seem quite intelligent
but still do many dumb things in “real life.” A good analogy for
this is a high-performance computer running bad software. The
CPU is a work of exquisite engineering, but if you try to use
such a computer, task performance will be suboptimal and frus-
trating. The point here is simple: “raw” executive functioning
matters for many social tasks, but so does the content of peo-
ple’s beliefs and strategies – their rationality and match to the
environment (both in terms of controlled and automatic mental
processes). Social life affects executive functioning. But social life,
especially who people interact and associate with, also plays a cen-
tral role in the beliefs and values that end up populating people’s
minds.
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